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THE SEARCH FOR AMERICA’S MOST ELIGIBLE 
PATENT: THE IMPACT OF THE BILSKI DECISION ON 
OBTAINING PATENTS FOR PROCESSES AND BUSINESS 
METHODS 
ABSTRACT 
For one year, the business community, patent lawyers, and the media 
in the United States speculated as to how the Supreme Court would rule in 
Bilski v. Kappos. Some forecasted the end of all business method patents, 
while others advanced the idea that after the case, practically any busi-
ness method could be patented. When the dust settled, the Court’s holding 
did neither: it determined that the machine-or-transformation test is not 
the exclusive test for patent eligibility under Section 101, and left open the 
possibility for business method patents to withstand future challenges. 
While this result frustrated many that advocated for a bright-line rule, 
the Court decided Bilski correctly. Instead of making a sweeping decree, 
the Court placed the burden back on the Court of Appeals for the Federal 
Circuit (CAFC) to develop a nuanced body of case law concerning busi-
ness method patents and the qualities sufficient to pass muster under Sec-
tion 101. The CAFC is exactly where this type of case law should be made, 
because it has a level of experience in deciding patent appeals cases and 
developing patent law that is unmatched. This also leaves the door open 
for the Supreme Court to take a future case regarding business method 
patents if an issue arises regarding the case law made by the CAFC. As 
the nature of technology remains a fluid concept, the laws that govern this 
field need to be able to adapt with changing circumstances. The Supreme 
Court’s holding in Bilski facilitates this concept, but further complicates 
business method analysis. 
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INTRODUCTION 
For one year, the business community, patent lawyers, and the media 
in the United States speculated as to how the Supreme Court would rule in 
Bilski v. Kappos. Beginning with the Supreme Court’s decision to grant 
certiorari to Bernard Bilski and Rand Warsaw on June 1, 2009,
1
 and con-
tinuing through when the Supreme Court issued its opinion on June 28, 
2010,
2
 licensing companies, investment banks, patent brokers, lobbyists, 
patent attorneys, and intellectual property scholars eagerly awaited the 
ruling from the high court.
3
 At issue was the patent eligibility of a business 
method. If the Court decided the case broadly, many feared the invalida-
tion of all business method patents, which would forever change com-
merce in the United States.
4
 
The central issue in Bilski v. Kappos was whether a method of hedging 
the risk of commodities trading in the energy market could be categorized 
as a “process”—this per the definition of that term in the Patent Law sec-
tion of the United States Code: 35 U.S.C. § 101 (Section 101),
5
 and in case 
law that further defined the scope of Section 101.
6
 Section 101 states that 
“[w]hoever invents or discovers any new and useful process ... or any new 
and useful improvement thereof, may obtain a patent therefore, subject to 
the conditions and requirements of this title.”
7
 This decision had the poten-
tial to affect business on a much larger scale than the narrow context of 
energy market commodities in Bilski, because the Supreme Court was 
presented with the opportunity to invalidate all business method patents.
8
 
                                                 
1 David Carney, Supreme Court Grants Cert in In re Bilski, TECH. L.J., (June 1, 
2009), http://www.techlawjournal.com/topstories/2009/20090601.asp. 
2 Bilski v. Kappos, 130 S. Ct. 3218 (2010). 
3 See Jon Schwartz, Broad View of Patents on Methods, N.Y. TIMES, June 29, 2010, at 
B1. 
4 See id. 
5 35 U.S.C. § 101 (2006). 
6 Bilski, 130 S. Ct. at 3225. For case law that defined the scope of Section 101, see 
Diamond v. Chakrabarty, 447 U.S. 303, 309 (1980) (holding that a man-made, living 
micro-organism “plainly qualifies as patentable subject matter”); State St. Bank & Trust 
Co. v. Signature Fin. Grp., 149 F.3d 1368, 1370 (Fed. Cir. 1998) (holding that petition-
er’s patent claims to a data processing system were directed to statutory subject matter). 
Though both the United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit and the Supreme 
Court subsequently overruled the State Street holding in Bilski, State Street represented 
the law that lower courts applied before the Bilski line of cases. 
7 35 U.S.C. § 101. 
8 See Steve Lohr, Bilski Ruling: The Patent Wars Untouched, N.Y. TIMES BITS BLOG 
(June 28, 2010, 7:31 PM), http://bits.blogs.nytimes.com/2010/06/28/bilski-ruling-the-pat 
ent-wars-untouched/. 
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Concern among big businesses was sufficiently high for Microsoft and 
Google to file amicus briefs, “appealing for court-defined clarity on what 
is and is not a patentable idea.”
9
 
When the Supreme Court finally issued its long-awaited opinion, the 
narrow holding was both anticlimactic
10
 and unhelpful in applying a pro-
spective rule regarding business method patents.
11
 The Supreme Court 
held that the machine-or-transformation test is not the sole test for deter-
mining the patent eligibility of a process,
12
 and that Bilski and Warsaw’s 
method of hedging the risk of commodities trading in the energy market 
was an “unpatentable abstract idea.”
13
 Josh Lerner, a Harvard Business 
School patent expert, noted: “The court is certainly not shutting the door 
on business method patents, as some thought it might .... This [decision] 
preserves a fair amount of ambiguity.”
14
 Though companies such as Mi-
crosoft and Google argued for a bright line test in their amicus briefs,
15
 
I.B.M. advocated a holding more in line with the Supreme Court’s ulti-
mate decision.
16
 This indicates a lack of consensus among even big busi-
nesses as to the most preferable means of business method patent review. 
On one side stand supporters for a bright line rule; on the other are those 
in favor of case-by-case review, an approach that could potentially in-
crease litigation.
17
 
Part I of this Note will first examine the machine-or-transformation 
test as one method of determining the patent eligibility of a process, as 
well as the relationship between that test and Section 101, which indicates 
the type of subject matter that is patentable. Part I will then examine pro-
posed changes to Section 101 by the U.S. Patent and Trademark Office 
(PTO), prior case law, and the decision rendered by the Court in Bilski. 
                                                 
9 Id. 
10 Id. (“The court [sic] issued its much-anticipated ruling in the big patent case ... and 
it was anything but a landmark decision.”). 
11 See id. (“Companies ... will be forced to navigate an increasingly abstract patent 
minefield, raising business uncertainty and legal costs.”) (internal quotation marks omit-
ted). 
12 Bilski v. Kappos, 130 S. Ct. 3218, 3227 (2010). 
13 Id. at 3231. 
14 Lohr, supra note 8 (internal quotation marks omitted). 
15 See id. 
16 Id. (“Manny W. Schecter, I.B.M.’s chief patent counsel, praised the Supreme Court 
decision as a measured middle ground—‘exactly what I.B.M. argued for,’ in its brief 
filed with the court.”). 
17 See Jon Schwartz, Justices Hear Patent Case on Protecting the Abstract, N.Y. 
TIMES, Nov. 10, 2009, at B1. Schwartz discusses how some technology companies, such 
as Yahoo, favored a broad reading of patent protection, while others, such as Microsoft 
and Google, argued for restricting business method patents. Id. 
2012] SEARCH FOR AMERICA’S MOST ELIGIBLE PATENT 579 
 
Part II will look at decisions from the United States Court of Appeals for 
the Federal Circuit (CAFC) that followed in the wake of the Bilski hold-
ing. Finally, Part III will argue that the Court correctly arrived at its hold-
ing in Bilski, and that it is the responsibility of the CAFC to develop case 
law on patent eligibility. 
I. BACKGROUND 
A. Machine-or-Transformation Test 
The CAFC reiterated the “machine-or-transformation” test in its In re 
Bilski opinion: “A claimed process is surely patent-eligible under § 101 if: 
(1) it is tied to a particular machine or apparatus, or (2) it transforms a 
particular article into a different state or thing.”
18
 In articulating this test, 
the CAFC abandoned its previous test for deciding whether a claimed 
invention was a patentable “process” under Section 101.
19
 That test had 
asked whether the process produced “a useful, concrete, and tangible re-
sult.”
20
 
In abandoning its earlier test, the CAFC held the “machine-or-
transformation test” to now be “the sole test governing § 101 analyses,”
21
 
and thus the dispositive “test for determining patent eligibility of a process 
under § 101.”
22
 Upon subsequently applying the machine-or-transforma-
                                                 
18 In re Bilski, 545 F.3d 943, 956 (Fed. Cir. 2008). For earlier uses of the machine-or-
transformation test, see also Diamond v. Diehr, 450 U.S. 175, 184 (1981) (holding re-
spondent’s claim drawn to patentable subject matter because it transformed an article into 
a different state or thing); Parker v. Flook, 437 U.S. 584, 588 n.9 (1978) (arguing that the 
Court could be seen at the time as having “only recognized a process as within the statu-
tory definition when it either was tied to a particular apparatus or operated to change 
materials to a ‘different state or thing.’” (quoting Cochrane v. Deener, 94 U.S. 780, 787–
88 (1877))); Gottschalk v. Benson, 409 U.S. 63, 68 (1972) (indicating the rationale be-
hind the machine-or-transformation test dates back at least as far as the Court’s nine-
teenth century decision in O’Reilly v. Morse, 56 U.S. (15 How.) 62 (1853)). 
19 See id. at 991 (Newman, J., dissenting) (criticizing the majority for departing from 
the analysis of prior rulings). 
20 State St. Bank & Trust Co. v. Signature Fin. Grp., 149 F.3d 1368, 1373 (Fed. Cir. 
1998). The PTO granted Signature Financial Group U.S. Patent 5,193,056, entitled “Data 
Processing System for Hub and Spoke Financial Services Configuration.” The “spokes” 
were mutual funds that pooled their assets in a central “hub.” See AT&T Corp. v. Excel 
Commc’ns, Inc., 172 F.3d 1352, 1357 (Fed. Cir. 1999) (citing In re Alappat, 33 F.3d 
1526, 1544 (Fed. Cir. 1994)) (finding accord with Supreme Court rulings that an algo-
rithm may be patentable if applied in a useful manner). 
21 In re Bilski, 545 F.3d at 955–56. 
22 Id. at 956. 
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tion test, the CAFC held in In re Bilski that the petitioners’ application was 
not patent-eligible.
23
 
Bernard Bilski and Rand Warsaw’s chances of successfully achieving 
patent eligibility would probably have been much greater under the 
CAFC’s previous test. 
24
 Their claimed invention used a process to pro-
duce instructions to commodities traders on how to hedge their invest-
ments based on changing market conditions, and satisfying this standard 
would have been much easier than the test the CAFC adopted, because 
Bilski and Warsaw would argue that their process produced useful, con-
crete, and tangible results in the form of the instructions to commodities 
traders.
25
 In what appeared to be an attempt by the CAFC to limit the 
scope of business method patents, however, it essentially changed the 
rules of the game. Because the holding indicated that the “machine-or-
transformation” method was now the exclusive test, the validity of all 
business method patents was suddenly in jeopardy. In order to more fully 
understand the impact of the CAFC’s holding in In re Bilski, it is im-
portant to underscore how Section 101 interacts with the machine-or-
transformation test and business method patents in general. 
B. Section 101 
Section 101 states: “Whoever invents or discovers any new and useful 
process, machine, manufacture, or composition of matter, or any new and 
useful improvement thereof, may obtain a patent therefor, subject to the 
conditions and requirements of this title.”
26
 The broad language of Section 
101 requires both the federal courts and the PTO to determine more spe-
cific requirements for a new and useful process.
27
 After the decision in 
Bilski, the PTO issued interim guidelines for its examiners to use while the 
organization worked on rewriting the guidelines.
28
 The new factors 
                                                 
23 Id. at 963–66. 
24 See supra note 20 and accompanying text. 
25 See Bilski v. Kappos, 130 S. Ct. 3218, 3223 (2010). 
26 35 U.S.C. § 101 (2006). 
27 See In re Bilski, 545 F.3d at 952 (“And the underlying legal question thus presented 
is what test or set of criteria governs the determination by the Patent and Trademark 
Office (‘PTO’) or courts as to whether a claim to a process is patentable under § 101 
....”). 
28 See Memorandum from Robert W. Bahr, Acting Assoc. Comm’r for Patent Exami-
nation Policy to the Patent Examining Corps (July 27, 2010), available at http://www 
.uspto.gov/patents/law/exam/bilski_guidance_27jul2010.pdf (“The Interim Bilski Guid-
ance provides factors to consider in determining whether a claim is directed to an abstract 
idea and is therefore not patent-eligible under 35 U.S.C. § 101. Under the Interim Bilski 
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“should be considered when analyzing the claim as a whole to evaluate 
whether a method claim is directed to an abstract idea.”
29
 The factors that 
weigh in favor of eligibility for a patent are: “Recitation of a machine or 
transformation (either express or inherent),” “[t]he claim is directed to-
ward applying a law of nature,” and “[t]he claim is more than a mere 
statement of a concept.”
30
 The listed factors that weigh in favor of ineligi-
bility are simply the negative forms of the factors weighing in favor of 
eligibility. While this is obvious, it does not give much specific guidance 
other than adding “no” or “not” to the criteria for eligibility.
31
 It seems as 
though the PTO, perhaps rightfully so, is not entirely clear on the specific 
criteria to be used in evaluating process applications following the Bilski 
opinion. 
It is evident that Section 101 and the accompanying PTO interim 
guidelines provide limited assistance to patent holders and licensing com-
panies trying to predict whether their patents will be deemed invalid after 
Bilski. As a result, these tougher questions may have to be litigated in 
order to obtain a definitive response, as opposed to reliance on a bright 
line rule. The Supreme Court’s interpretation of Section 101 provides 
some guidance, but only in very general terms. 
C. The Supreme Court’s Interpretation of Section 101 
On a few occasions, the Supreme Court has commented on the scope 
of Section 101.
32
 In Kewanee Oil Co. v. Bicron Corp.,
33
 the Court indicat-
ed that Section 101 operates as an initial threshold condition: “[N]o patent 
is available for a discovery, however useful, novel, and nonobvious, unless 
it falls within one of the express categories of patentable subject mat-
ter....”
34
 Thus, the Supreme Court indicated that in order for an invention 
                                                                                                                         
Guidance, factors that weigh in favor of patent-eligibility satisfy the criteria of the ma-
chine-or-transformation test or provide evidence that the abstract idea has been practical-
ly applied, and factors that weigh against patent-eligibility neither satisfy the criteria of 
the machine-or-transformation test nor provide evidence that the abstract idea has been 
practically applied.”). 
29 101 Method Eligibility Quick Reference Sheet, U.S. PAT. & TRADEMARK OFF., http: 
//www.uspto.gov/patents/announce/bilski_qrs.pdf (last updated Mar. 7, 2011). 
30 Id. 
31 See id. 
32 See Diamond v. Chakrabarty, 447 U.S. 303, 308 (1980); Kewanee Oil Co. v. Bic-
ron Corp., 416 U.S. 470, 483 (1974). 
33 Kewanee Oil, 416 U.S. at 470. 
34 Id. at 483. 
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to be patentable, it must fall within the “process” requirement of Section 
101.
35
 
The Supreme Court also indicated in Diamond v. Chakrabarty
36
 that, 
“[i]n choosing such expansive terms [in Section 101] Congress plainly 
contemplated that the patent laws would be given wide scope.”
37
 The 
Court, however, went on to state that “[t]his is not to suggest that § 101 
has no limits or that it embraces every discovery. The laws of nature, 
physical phenomena, and abstract ideas have been held not patentable.”
38
 
For an abstract idea, the Court gave the example that Isaac Newton would 
not have been able to patent the law of gravity, because this was some-
thing “free to all men.”
39
 Therefore, although the Court indicated in Dia-
mond that Congress intended the words of Section 101 to be interpreted 
expansively, it concluded that abstract ideas fall outside the Section’s 
scope.
40
 
Before Bilski, the Court did not elaborate on exactly where the line 
should be drawn regarding abstract ideas.
41
 A number of different factors 
ultimately forced the Court to decide to clarify this line, including: the 
CAFC’s holding in In re Bilski, the language of Section 101, and the Su-
preme Court’s prior interpretation of Section 101. These factors effective-
ly set the stage for the Court’s decision in Bilski v. Kappos. 
D. Bilski v. Kappos: Patent Eligibility Under Section 101 
Bernard L. Bilski and Rand Warsaw filed a patent application on April 
10, 1997 for a method of hedging the risk of commodities trading in the 
energy market based on weather patterns and an analysis of historical 
                                                 
35 Id. 
36 Chakrabarty, 447 U.S. at 303. 
37 Id. at 308. 
38 Id. at 309; see also Bilski v. Kappos, 130 S. Ct. 3218, 3225 (2010) (“While these 
exceptions are not required by the statutory text, they are consistent with the notion that a 
patentable process must be ‘new and useful.’ And, in any case, these exceptions have 
defined the reach of the statute as a matter of statutory stare decisis going back 150 
years.” (citing Le Roy v. Tatham, 14 How. 156, 174–75 (1853))). 
39 Chakrabarty, 447 U.S. at 309 (quoting Funk Brothers Seed Co. v. Kalo Inoculant 
Co., 333 U.S. 127, 130 (1948)); see also Bonito Boats, Inc. v. Thunder Craft Boats, Inc., 
489 U.S. 141, 151 (1989). 
40 See Diamond v. Diehr, 450 U.S. 175, 185 (1981) (“This Court has undoubtedly 
recognized limits to § 101 .... Excluded from such patent protection are laws of nature, 
natural phenomena, and abstract ideas.”). 
41 See Parker v. Flook, 437 U.S. 584, 589 (1978) (“The line between a patentable 
‘process’ and an unpatentable ‘principle’ is not always clear.”). 
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pricing.
42
 The patent examiner rejected Bilski and Warsaw’s patent.
43
 
Subsequently, the Board of Patent Appeals and later the CAFC affirmed 
the patent examiner’s ruling.
44
 
The important claims for the patent application were claims one and 
four.
45
 Claim one explained a sequence of steps on how to hedge risk.
46
 
Claim four plugged the concept described in claim one into a mathemati-
cal formula.
47
 The other claims in the application described how claims 
one and four could be applied “to allow energy suppliers and consumers to 
minimize the risks resulting from fluctuations in market demand for ener-
gy.”
48
 Kappos argued three reasons why the invention should not be pa-
tent-eligible: “(1) [I]t is not tied to a machine and does not transform an 
article; (2) it involves a method of conducting business; and (3) it is mere-
ly an abstract idea.”
49
 Bilski argued that nothing in Section 101 or the 
Supreme Court’s jurisprudence mandated limiting approval of process 
patents to those claimed inventions that satisfied the machine-or-transfor-
mation test.
50
 
The Supreme Court disagreed with the CAFC’s holding that the ma-
chine-or-transformation test was the sole test for determining whether an 
invention was a process, as the Court thought that this decision “impose[d] 
other limitations that are inconsistent with the text and the statute’s pur-
pose and design.”
51
 The Court did not, however, indicate that the machine-
or-transformation test was an incorrect test; it simply stated that it was not 
the sole test.
52
 The Court explained: “A categorical rule denying patent 
protection for ‘inventions in areas not contemplated by Congress ... would 
                                                 
42 Bilski, 130 S. Ct. at 3223–24. 
43 Id. The patent examiner explained that “[the application] is not implemented on a 
specific apparatus and merely manipulates [an] abstract idea and solves a purely mathe-
matical problem without any limitation to a practical application, therefore, the invention 
is not directed to the technological arts.” (second alteration in original) (quoting App. to 
Pet. for Cert. 148a) (internal quotation marks omitted). Id. 
44 Id. at 3224. 
45 Id. at 3223. 
46 Id. at 3223–24. 
47 Id. at 3223. 
48 Bilski, 130 S. Ct. at 3224. 
49 Id. at 3223. 
50 See Reply Brief for Petitioner at 3, Bilski, 130 S. Ct. 3218 (No. 08-964), 2009 WL 
3453657 at *3. 
51 Bilski, 130 S. Ct. at 3226. 
52 See id. (“Adopting the machine-or-transformation test as the sole test for what con-
stitutes a ‘process’ (as opposed to just an important and useful clue) violates ... statutory 
interpretation principles.”). 
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frustrate the purposes of the patent law.’”
53
 As an example, the Court 
illustrated that if a categorical rule for patent applications had been previ-
ously adopted, many “unforeseen” innovations such as computer programs 
would not have been able to receive patents.
54
 Patent law is seen as a dy-
namic field, one in which categorical rules are not particularly well suit-
ed.
55
 
The Court took no position on where to draw the line as to which spe-
cific criteria were important in making the determination on what types of 
inventions should be deemed patent-eligible.
56
 The decision did not cate-
gorically foreclose the possibility of business methods receiving patents in 
the future, and it did not invalidate business method patents previously 
issued by the PTO.
57
 In so deciding, the Court avoided the catastrophic 
result feared by many in the business sector.
58
 Here, the Court essentially 
declined to articulate a bright-line test that could be applied in future cas-
es, as urged by Google and Microsoft in their respective amicus briefs.
59
 
After clarifying that the machine-or-transformation test was not the 
sole test for determining whether a process was patent-eligible, but rather 
a factor that could be considered, the Court indicated that the patent appli-
cation at issue was correctly rejected because it represented an “abstract 
idea.”
60
 The Court looked to precedent established in three previous patent 
cases to arrive at this conclusion.
61
 Gottschalk v. Benson and Parker v. 
Flook both involved petitioners attempting to patent a mathematical algo-
rithm.
62
 In both cases, the Court reasoned that the algorithms at issue were 
                                                 
53 Id. at 3227 (alteration in original) (quoting Diamond v. Chakrabarty, 447 U.S. 303, 
315 (1980)). 
54 See Bilski, 130 S. Ct. at 3227. 
55 See id. 
56 See id. at 3228 (“With ever more people trying to innovate and thus seeking patent 
protections for their inventions, the patent law faces a great challenge in striking the 
balance between protecting inventors and not granting monopolies over procedures that 
others would discover by independent, creative application of general principles. Nothing 
in this opinion should be read to take a position on where that balance ought to be 
struck.”). 
57 See id. (“[T]he Court today is not commenting on the patentability of any particular 
invention, let alone holding that any of the above-mentioned technologies from the In-
formation Age should or should not receive patent protection.”). 
58 See supra notes 3–4, 8–9 and accompanying text. 
59 See Lohr, supra note 8. 
60 Bilski, 130 S. Ct. at 3229–30. 
61 Id. (discussing the rulings in Diamond v. Diehr, 450 U.S. 175 (1980), Parker v. 
Flook, 437 U.S. 584 (1978), and Gottschalk v. Benson, 409 U.S. 63 (1972)). 
62 See id. at 3230. 
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abstract ideas and not processes.
63
 On the other hand, in Diamond v. 
Diehr, the Court held that the patent application in question was in fact a 
process, because though it included a mathematical formula, it used the 
mathematical formula to “mold[] raw, uncured synthetic rubber into cured 
precision products,” and the Court considered this a tangible result that 
met the requirements of Section 101.
64
 Applying the principles from the 
three cases above, the Court concluded that Bilski and Warsaw’s claims 
were more like the algorithms from Benson and Flook, and were thus un-
patentable abstract ideas.
65
 
All nine justices agreed that the patent examiner correctly denied 
Bilski’s application to patent a method of hedging risk in commodities 
trading.
66
 Justice Kennedy wrote the opinion and was joined in full by 
Chief Justice Roberts and Justices Thomas and Alito.
67
 Justice Stevens 
wrote a concurrence joined by Justices Ginsburg, Breyer, and Sotomayor.
68
 
These justices agreed that the machine-or-transformation test was not the 
sole test for determining whether a process was patent-eligible under Sec-
tion 101, but indicated that they did not believe business methods should 
be patent-eligible under any circumstances.
69
 
Justice Breyer, joined in part by Justice Scalia, filed a separate concur-
rence.
70
 Though the latter Justice did not join with the former’s view that 
business methods were not patent-eligible,
71
 the two did find common 
ground in Justice Breyer’s highlighting of four substantive points.
72
 First, 
though Section 101 is broad, Justice Breyer wrote that “it is not without 
                                                 
63 See id. (“The Court [in Benson] then held the application at issue was not a ‘pro-
cess,’ but an unpatentable abstract idea .... Flook stands for the proposition that the prohi-
bition against patenting abstract ideas ‘cannot be circumvented by attempting to limit the 
use of the formula to a particular technological environment’ or adding ‘insignificant 
postsolution activity.’” (quoting Diehr, 450 U.S. at 191–92)). 
64 Id. (“Diehr explained that while an abstract idea, law of nature, or mathematical 
formula could not be patented, ‘an application of a law of nature or mathematical formu-
la to a known structure or process may well be deserving of patent protection.’” (quoting 
Diehr, 450 U.S. at 187)). 
65 See id. at 3231. 
66 Bilski, 130 S. Ct. at 3230 (“[A]ll members of the Court agree that the patent appli-
cation at issue here falls outside of § 101 because it claims an abstract idea.”). 
67 Id. at 3223. 
68 Id. 
69 See id. at 3232 (“More precisely, although a process is not patent-ineligible simply 
because it is useful for conducting business, a claim that merely describes a method of 
doing business does not qualify as a ‘process’ under § 101.”). 
70 Id. at 3223. 
71 Id. at 3257. 
72 Bilski, 130 S. Ct. at 3258–59. 
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limit.”
73
 Second, he noted that the machine-or-transformation test has 
repeatedly helped the Supreme Court decide what a patentable process 
is.
74
 Third, Breyer observed that, “while the machine-or-transformation 
test has always been a ‘useful and important clue,’ it has never been the 
‘sole test’ for determining patentability.”
75
 Fourth, Breyer asserted that the 
Court’s decision cannot be read as reviving the discredited patentability 
test of whether a process produces “a useful, concrete, and tangible re-
sult.”
76
 
With the Justices offering so many views on the matter, no one opin-
ion carried the majority of the Court. The only point on which all Justices 
could agree was that Bilski and Warsaw’s patent application should be 
denied. 
II. ANALYSIS 
A. The Bilski Holding 
The Court rejected adopting a categorical rule that would exclude pa-
tenting business methods.
77
 Bilski, however, seemed to provide no new 
guidance or test for determining whether a process or method may be 
patented under Section 101. The question arises, therefore, as to whether 
Bilski actually changed anything, or whether it simply reiterated the law as 
it existed. Going forward, it seems as though the patent eligibility of all 
such new processes will be determined on a case-by-case basis under this 
Supreme Court precedent, which provides little substantive guidance for 
analyzing the difficult grey areas in the arena of patent law. 
Bilski holds that the machine-or-transformation test is an important 
clue, but not the exclusive test for deciding if new processes or methods 
are patentable.
78
 Although Bilski does not preclude the patentability of all 
business methods in the future, the decision does indicate that business 
methods like the one brought by Bilski will not be approved. Adding to 
the uncertainty was the insistence of four Justices who stated that business 
                                                 
73 Id. at 3258. 
74 Id. 
75 Id. 
76 Id. at 3259 (quoting State St. Bank & Trust Co. v. Signature Fin. Grp., 149 F.3d 
1368 (Fed. Cir. 1998)) (“[I]n reemphasizing that the machine-or-transformation test is not 
necessarily the sole test of patentability, the Court intends neither to deemphasize the 
test’s usefulness, nor to suggest that many patentable processes lie beyond its reach.”). 
77 Id. at 3231. 
78 Bilski, 130 S. Ct. at 3231. 
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methods are not patentable at all
79
—though of those four, Justice Stevens 
has since retired.
80
 Finally, there remains no clear agreement as to how the 
statutory language in Section 101 should be interpreted.
81
 
B. Other Cases That Implicate Bilski 
1. Prometheus Laboratories, Inc. v. Mayo Collaborative Services: Ap-
plying the Bilski Holding 
In one of the first cases to be reviewed after the Supreme Court’s hold-
ing in Bilski, the CAFC reviewed a case returned to them on remand from 
the Supreme Court.
82
 The Supreme Court remanded the case so that the 
CAFC could consider the issue by taking into account the Bilski deci-
sion.
83
 
At issue in Prometheus were patents “which claim methods for deter-
mining the optimal dosage of thiopurine drugs used to treat gastrointesti-
nal and non-gastrointestinal autoimmune diseases.”
84
 At the trial level, the 
district court found that “the claims have three steps: (1) administering the 
drug to a subject, (2) determining metabolite levels, and (3) being warned 
that an adjustment in dosage may be required.”
85
 The district court indi-
cated that simply because the inventors described the claims as “treatment 
methods,” this did not make them “patent-eligible subject matter.”
86
 In 
particular, the district court found that the first two steps were “merely 
necessary data-gathering steps for any use of the correlations.”
87
 The third 
step, the district court stated, was “only a mental step.”
88
 In concluding 
that the claims were not patent-eligible, the district court found that the 
third “warning” step was not really a step at all, because “it was the me-
tabolite levels themselves that ‘warn’ the doctor that an adjustment in 
dosage may be required.”
89
 
                                                 
79 See id. at 3223. 
80 See Bill Mears, Court Ends Term, Offering Tributes to Stevens, CNN JUSTICE (June 
28, 2010), http://articles.cnn.com/2010-06-28/justice/us.scotus.stevens_1_court-ends-ter 
m-chief-justice-john-roberts-supreme-court?_s=PM:CRIME. 
81 Bilski, 130 S. Ct. at 3231. 
82 See Prometheus Labs., Inc. v. Mayo Collaborative Servs., 628 F.3d 1347, 1349 
(Fed. Cir. 2010). 
83 Id. 
84 Id. at 1349–50. 
85 Id. at 1352. 
86 Id. 
87 Id. 
88 Prometheus Labs., 628 F.3d at 1352. 
89 Id. 
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Regarding its first Prometheus opinion, issued prior to the Bilski hold-
ing, the CAFC explained its rejection of the district court’s findings by 
stating: 
We held that the district court erred as a matter of law in finding Pro-
metheus’s asserted medical treatment claims to be drawn to non-
statutory subject matter under this court’s machine-or-transformation 
test, which we had held in In re Bilski, 545 F.3d 943 (Fed. Cir. 2008), 
to be the definitive test for determining the patentability of a process 
under § 101.90 
In other words, in its initial Prometheus decision vacated by the Su-
preme Court after Bilski, the CAFC had indicated that the claims were 
valid under the machine-or-transformation test.
91
 
Importantly, the Supreme Court acknowledged the CAFC’s Prome-
theus holding, and remanded the case in light of its Bilski decision.
92
 In 
Bilski, the Court indicated that “laws of nature, physical phenomena, and 
abstract ideas” have been held not patentable.
93
 Applications of these three 
categories, however, might qualify for a patent.
94
 The CAFC had to de-
cide, therefore, whether the claims in Prometheus attempted to patent a 
natural phenomenon, or if the claims represented instead an application of 
that phenomenon.
95
 The CAFC affirmed its previous holding, taking into 
account the Supreme Court’s conclusion in Bilski.
96
 
The CAFC stated that “[t]he Supreme Court’s decision in Bilski did 
not undermine our preemption analysis of Prometheus’s claims and it 
rejected the machine-or-transformation test only as a definitive test.”
97
 
Therefore, because the Supreme Court left the preemption analysis un-
touched, this language from the CAFC demonstrates the limitations of the 
holding in Bilski. Perhaps a reason the Supreme Court granted certiorari in 
Bilski was to confirm what many already believed: Bilski did not signifi-
cantly alter the landscape of patent-eligible claims. 
                                                 
90 Id. at 1349. 
91 Kevin E. Noonan, Prometheus Laboratories, Inc. v. Mayo Collaborative Services 
(Fed. Cir. 2010), PATENT DOCS (Dec. 20, 2010, 11:59 PM), http://www.patentdocs.org/2 
010/12/prometheus-laboratories-inc-v-mayo-collaborative-services-fed-cir-2010.html. 
92 Prometheus Labs., 628 F.3d at 1349. 
93 Bilski v. Kappos, 130 S. Ct. 3218, 3225 (2010). 
94 See id. at 3229–30. 
95 Prometheus Labs., 628 F.3d at 1354. 
96 Id. at 1349. 
97 Id. at 1355. 
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The CAFC succinctly summarized in Prometheus exactly what the 
Supreme Court accomplished in Bilski.
98
 The CAFC wrote: “The [Su-
preme] Court merely stated that the Court of Appeals incorrectly conclud-
ed that this Court has endorsed the machine-or-transformation test as the 
exclusive test.”
99
 Some commentators have argued that the real mandate 
from the Supreme Court in Bilski was to signal to the CAFC a need to 
develop and refine their case law regarding what constitutes an “abstract 
idea” for patent-eligibility.
100
 
Finally, the CAFC indicated that Prometheus’s claims satisfied the 
transformation prong of the machine-or-transformation test, because their 
invention transforms the human body and its components after the concen-
trations are determined and the drugs are administered.
101
 Because the 
claims independently satisfied the transformation prong of the machine-or-
transformation test, the CAFC did not need to assess whether they consti-
tuted a machine.
102
 The CAFC, possibly supplementing its definition of 
patent-eligible claims, indicated that “[t]he asserted claims are in effect 
claims to methods of treatment, which are always transformative when 
one of a defined group of drugs is administered to the body to ameliorate 
the effects of an undesired condition.”
103
 
                                                 
98 Id. 
99 Id. at 1355. The Court of Appeals added: “Thus, the Court did not disavow the ma-
chine-or-transformation test. And, as applied to the present claims, the ‘useful and im-
portant clue, an investigative tool,’ leads to a clear and compelling conclusion, viz., that 
the present claims pass muster under § 101. They do not encompass laws of nature or 
preempt natural correlations.” Id. 
100 See Noonan, supra note 91 (“Such an approach has the potential to adequately (or 
at least sufficiently) illuminate the relevant principles in the fire of litigation, to provide a 
collection of decisions that might assist the Court when (and if) it decides to reenter the 
patent-eligibility waters. The Court in Bilski was properly prudent in its approach with 
regard to ‘new technologies’”); see also Jason Rantenen, Prometheus Laboratories v. 
Mayo: The Broad Scope of Statutory Subject Matter, PATENTLY-O (Dec. 22, 2010, 7:30 
AM), http://www.patentlyo.com/patent/2010/12/prometheus-laboratories-v-mayo-the-bro 
ad-scope-of-statutory-subject-matter.html (“Furthermore, the court stated, neither the 
Supreme Court’s order to vacate and remand the original Prometheus decision nor Bilski 
dictates a wholly different analysis or different result .... In support of its conclusion, the 
court reiterated its earlier determination that the treatment methods in Prometheus’s 
patents satisfy the ‘machine-or-transformation test.’ Although this is not the exclusive 
test, post-Bilski, it nevertheless provides important clues to subject matter patentabil-
[i]ty.”). 
101 Prometheus Labs., 628 F.3d at 1355. 
102 Id. at 1356. 
103 Id. (“More specifically, Prometheus here claimed methods for optimizing efficacy 
and reducing toxicity of treatment regimes for gastrointestinal and non-gastrointestinal 
autoimmune diseases that utilize drugs providing 6-TG by administering a drug to a 
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By affirming their pre-Bilski decision in Prometheus, the CAFC thus 
confirmed the very narrow holding of Bilski, which established that the 
machine-or-transformation test is not the exclusive test for determining 
patent eligibility. The CAFC took its cue from the Supreme Court, and 
continued to develop case law regarding the patent eligibility of abstract 
ideas. Without citing any cases, the CAFC stated that when a claim in-
volves a group of drugs that are administered to cure an illness, these 
claims are always classified as transformative.
104
 
If Prometheus is any indication of the types of patent eligibility opin-
ions we will see from the CAFC going forward, the court will continue to 
generate more detailed and nuanced case law regarding the patent eligibil-
ity of abstract ideas. The CAFC, while making decisions on a case-by-case 
basis, should also articulate rules whenever possible, as it did in Prome-
theus. 
Another case, Research Corporation Technologies v. Microsoft, was 
also decided by the CAFC shortly after Bilski, and similarly progressed the 
case law regarding process patents.
105
 
2. Research Corporation Technologies v. Microsoft: Refocusing the 
Eligibility Inquiry 
In Research Corporation, the CAFC reviewed a pre-Bilski decision of 
the United States District Court for the District of Arizona, which had held 
that two of Research Corporation Technologies’ (RCT) patents were ineli-
gible because they did not satisfy the machine-or-transformation test, and 
therefore that the defendant, Microsoft, had not infringed upon them.
106
 
RCT’s patents, said the district court, “relate to digital image halftoning. 
Digital images are, in fact, thousands of pixels arranged in arrays of rows 
and columns.”
107
 Essentially, the district court determined that RCT’s 
patents created a different type of halftoning called a “blue noise mask.”
108
 
Referring to Bilski, the CAFC indicated that “[i]n refocusing the eligi-
bility inquiry on the statute, the Supreme Court advised that [S]ection 101 
eligibility should not become a substitute for a patentability analysis relat-
                                                                                                                         
subject. The invention’s purpose to treat the human body is made clear in the specifica-
tion and the preambles of the asserted claims.”). 
104 See id. 
105 Research Corp. Techs. v. Microsoft, 627 F.3d 859 (Fed. Cir. 2010). 
106 See id. at 866. 
107 Id. at 862–63. 
108 Id. at 863 (“Another way to observe the quality of a halftone is to use a power 
spectrum associated with each dot profile obtained from the halftoning process.”). 
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ed to prior art, adequate disclosure, or the other conditions and require-
ments of Title 35.”
109
 The CAFC then classified the subject matter in the 
case at bar as the process for rending a halftone image.
110
 Then, the court 
specifically acknowledged that the Supreme Court had directed it to ex-
plore more deeply and define the question of whether a given subject mat-
ter is abstract, along with rejecting an inflexible singular test.
111
 As such, 
the CAFC declined to provide a rigid test, deciding only that, for a process 
to be patented, it must “override the broad statutory categories of eligible 
subject matter.”
112
 
The CAFC acknowledged that algorithms and formulas constituted a 
significant portion of the claims and stated that the “patents require a ‘high 
contrast film,’ ‘a film printer,’ ‘a memory,’ and ‘printer and display devic-
es’” in confirming that the patents were in fact not abstract.
113
 The CAFC, 
therefore, determined that even when significant equations or algorithms 
exist in a patent, if the patent also contains tangible devices, it will gener-
ally be protected from falling into the abstract category. It is unclear as to 
what the ratio of mathematical equations to tangible devices should be; 
however, this decision suggests that if a patent contains even a small num-
ber of tangible devices, that factor will save it from the “abstract” label. 
Some legal professionals claimed that the holding in Research Corpo-
ration “places a high hurdle in front of challengers who seek to invalidate 
process patents on the third ground [abstract idea].”
114
 Indeed, it does 
seem as though the bar is set high. Tough questions for the CAFC will 
involve scenarios that fall somewhere in between Bilski and Research 
Corporation. Research Corporation and Prometheus affirmed that the 
CAFC is going to determine which particular set of facts gives rise to 
patent eligibility on a case-by-case basis. These are two of the first post-
Bilski cases, and they indicate that the CAFC is committed to developing 
the scope of abstractness under Section 101. 
                                                 
109 Id. at 868 (“In other words, [S]ection 101 does not permit a court to reject subject 
matter categorically because it finds that a claim is not worthy of a patent.”). 
110 Id. 
111 Research Corp., 627 F.3d at 868 (“The Supreme Court did not presume to provide 
a rigid formula or definition for abstractness.”). 
112 Id. (“With that guidance, this court also will not presume to define ‘abstract’ be-
yond the recognition that this disqualifying characteristic should exhibit itself so mani-
festly as to override the broad statutory categories of eligible subject matter and the 
statutory context that directs primary attention on the patentability criteria of the rest of 
the Patent Act.”). 
113 Id. at 869. 
114 Rantenen, supra note 100. 
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This Note will proceed to discuss why the Supreme Court correctly 
decided Bilski, but it will also address problems associated with the Bilski 
holding. 
III. WHY THE SUPREME COURT CORRECTLY DECIDED BILSKI 
The Supreme Court correctly decided to issue a narrow holding in 
Bilski when it rejected adopting a categorical rule that would exclude 
patenting business methods.
115
 Even though Bilski concerned patent-
eligibility, at the heart of the case was the issue of abstractness and how 
the CAFC could better define aspects of a process that would invalidate a 
patent.
116
 
A. Practical Concerns with Issuing a Broad Holding 
If the Supreme Court had issued a broad holding in Bilski invalidating 
all business method patents, the decision could have potentially negatively 
affected the national economy, because many large businesses hold busi-
ness method patents.
117
 Conversely, had the Supreme Court issued a broad 
holding in the other direction to allow all forms of business methods, al-
most anything could then have been patented. In its amicus brief, IBM 
argued that patent-eligible subject matter for processes should be limited 
to processes that involve technological contributions.
118
 IBM, and others 
advancing that argument, seemed to be in line with the Court’s ruling. 
The concern with invalidating all business method patents, “such as 
software, biomarkers, medical diagnostics and information technology,” 
was the “concern that many patent portfolios that have been developed in 
these fields, at considerable time and expense, [and] may not have future 
value, or greatly diminished future value.”
119
 This diminished value could 
                                                 
115 Bilski v. Kappos, 130 S. Ct. 3218, 3229 (2010). 
116 See supra note 100 and accompanying text. 
117 See supra notes 3–4 and accompanying text. 
118 Brief for Int’l Bus. Mach. Corp. as Amicus Curiae in Support of Neither Party at 
2–3, Bilski, 130 S. Ct. 3218 (No. 08-964) (“IBM respectfully submits that the gravamen 
of that precedent, as informed by the constitutional objective of ‘promot[ing] the Progress 
of Science and useful Arts,’ is that a patentable ‘process’ within the meaning of § 101 is 
one that involves a technological contribution - namely, a process that either (i) is tied to 
a particular machine or apparatus, or (ii) causes transformation or reduction of an article 
to a different state or thing, and in either instance produces technologically beneficial 
results.”). 
119 Stuart S. Levy, Bilski v. Kappos: New Vista or End of the Road for Many Business 
Methods and New Technologies?, 79 PAT., TRADEMARK & COPYRIGHT J. (BNA) 283, at 
12 (Jan. 15, 2010). 
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potentially negatively affect the many companies that hold patents in “es-
tablished or emerging technologies.”
120
 While many amicus briefs were 
not in favor of either party, of the sixty-six amicus briefs filed for the 
Bilski Supreme Court case, sixty-one argued that the machine-or-transfor-
mation test should not be the sole test for patent-eligible subject matter.
121
 
Taking into account Supreme Court precedent, Congressional intent, 
and practical concerns, this was the holding that made the most sense for 
the Supreme Court to issue. In particular, a broad ruling from the Supreme 
Court would have been unwise given the presence of the CAFC, as that 
court’s specialization in patent cases leaves it much better equipped to 
create case law upon the presentation of patent claims.
122
 
B. The Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit Is in a Better Position to 
Make the Close Calls 
The CAFC is “unique among the thirteen Circuit Courts of Ap-
peals,”
123
 because it has exclusive jurisdiction over patent claims nation-
wide. With these claims appealed only to the CAFC, its judges are particu-
larly familiar with such cases.
124
 It is much more responsible for the 
Supreme Court to accept review when the CAFC has issued a holding that 
the Supreme Court feels needs clarification, rather than simply issuing a 
broad ruling in an area that is not its specialty. For these reasons, the 
CAFC is in a much better position to develop patent case law. 
Currently in its twenty-ninth year of existence, “the CAFC has steadily 
gained momentum, maturity, and acceptance.”
125
 The CAFC was created 
in the late 1970s in order to remedy “a faltering patent enforcement system 
that threatened further industrial, technological, employment, and econom-
ic decline.”
126
 While the CAFC does not exclusively hear patent cases, 
about one third of the cases the court decides every year are patent cases, 
                                                 
120 Id. 
121 Id. 
122 See infra notes 123–24 and accompanying text. 
123 Court Jurisdiction, U.S. COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE FED. CIRCUIT, http://www.ca 
fc.uscourts.gov/the-court/court-jurisdiction.html (last visited Mar. 25, 2012) (“It has 
nationwide jurisdiction in a variety of subject areas, including international trade, gov-
ernment contracts, patents, trademarks, certain money claims against the United States 
government, federal personnel, veterans’ benefits, and public safety officers’ benefits 
claims.”). 
124 Id. 
125 Paul R. Michel, Past, Present, and Future in the Life of the U.S. Court of Appeals 
for the Federal Circuit, 59 AM. U. L. REV. 1199, 1199 (2010). 
126 Id. at 1200. 
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and at least five of the sixteen judges presently on the court were patent 
attorneys before appointment to the bench.
127
 Typically, a panel of judges 
hearing any given case will be composed of one or two judges with a pa-
tent background and one or two judges without a patent background.
128
 
Additionally, all of the judges of the CAFC are required to live in Wash-
ington, D.C.
129
 As former Chief Judge Michel has written: “Some consider 
our court the technology court—and so it is. But it is also the business and 
commerce court, the innovation court, and the job-creating, prosperity-
expanding court. It is, in short, a national asset.”
130
 
The CAFC possesses a level of experience in deciding patent appeals 
cases and developing patent law that is unmatched in the other circuits. 
The Supreme Court correctly issued a narrow holding in Bilski, allowing 
the CAFC to establish clearer patent-eligibility requirements in light of the 
Supreme Court’s decision that the machine-or-transformation test is not 
the sole method for determining patent eligibility. As seen from decisions 
such as Prometheus and Research Corporation, it is in the CAFC where a 
body of nuanced and meaningful patent eligibility law can and should be 
developed. 
C. Problems Caused by the Holding in Bilski 
One of the major problems with the holding in Bilski is that it encour-
ages litigation to determine whether a specific patent qualifies as abstract. 
Specifically, by the Supreme Court’s unspoken directive to the CAFC to 
further develop its case law, the Supreme Court’s Bilski decision will 
likely give rise to increased process patent litigation. 
Senator Patrick Leahy of Vermont is an outspoken critic of the Bilski 
holding.
131
 Senator Leahy has claimed that Bilski did not resolve the “real 
issue with business method patents,” and that it could spawn unnecessary 
                                                 
127 Id. at 1201. 
128 Id. at 1201–02. 
129 Id. at 1203 (“This proximity helps newer judges learn the many unfamiliar legal 
subjects they must master. It also helps all of our active judges work together more close-
ly, collegially, and continually than if the twelve were geographically dispersed across 
twelve different states. It should be noted that a proposal to revise the patent laws now 
pending in the Senate would rescind this residency requirement. Proponents, which 
include several of our judges, cite the symbolic benefit of judges of a national court 
having nationwide residency and the practical benefit of an even larger talent pool.”). 
130 Michel, supra note 125, at 1211. 
131 Jessica Dye, Leahy Says Bilski Exemplifies Patent Law Problems, LAW 360 (June 
28, 2010, 3:12 PM), http://www.law360.com/topnews/articles/177772/leahy-says-bilski-e 
xemplifies-patent-law-problems. 
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litigation unless Congress acts.
132
 Leahy has suggested that “[t]he Court’s 
opinion, joined by only five of the justices, needlessly left the door open 
for business method patents to issue in the future, and I am concerned that 
it will lead to more unnecessary litigation.”
133
 While unnecessary litigation 
is a valid concern and is often undesirable, it is more favorable than issu-
ing a broader holding that may significantly affect the United States econ-
omy in a negative way. 
Recently, the Senate passed a patent reform bill called the America In-
vents Act (the Act),
134
 which President Barack Obama signed into law on 
September 16, 2011.
135
 The Act did not include language affecting the 
Supreme Court’s holding in Bilski; rather, it called for a first-to-file patent 
system, thus constituting a significant change from the United States’ 
current first-to-invent system.
136
 Senator Leahy, the main sponsor of the 
Act, declared that “[t]he America Invents Act will promote American 
innovation, create American jobs and grow America’s economy, all with-
out spending a penny of taxpayer money.”
137
 The Act’s lack of reference 
to Bilski, meanwhile, indicates that Congress will likely not respond to 
that Supreme Court decision, instead allowing the CAFC to formulate its 
own law regarding tests for patent eligibility. 
CONCLUSION 
The Bilski case created much speculation as to both the future of busi-
ness method patents and the impact of a broad holding on commerce in the 
United States. The Supreme Court’s decision to issue a narrow holding, 
which simply determined that the machine-or-transformation test is not the 
exclusive test for patent eligibility,
138
 left open the possibility for business 
method patents to withstand future challenges. 
By its holding, the Court sent a message to the CAFC to refine and de-
velop its case law regarding abstractness as it relates to patent eligibility. 
In the cases following Bilski, the CAFC seemed to acknowledge this mes-
sage. While a bright-line rule such as the machine-or-transformation test 
                                                 
132 Id. 
133 Id. 
134 Hayley Tsukayama, The Circuit: Senate Passes Patent Reform, Hearing on Net 
Neutrality, Europe Grapples with Cookie Law, WASH. POST (Mar. 9, 2011, 8:45 AM), 
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135 Obama Signs Patent Reform Bill, CNN POLITICS (Sept. 16, 2011, 12:02 PM), http: 
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136 See id.; see also Tsukayama, supra note 134. 
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138 See supra note 12 and accompanying text. 
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can be beneficial in various circumstances, the Supreme Court correctly 
decided the scope of Bilski, because a subject as complex as patent eligi-
bility requires a nuanced approach supported by case law that evolves as 
technology changes. As the nature of technology remains a fluid concept, 
it is proper for the laws that govern this field to be able to adapt with the 
changing circumstances. 
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